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Chinese taukeh, labourer, and state control
 
Case study of panglong in eastern region of Sumatra  
(1890-1930)
Erwiza Erman 
AbstrAct
Recently the flow of labour from China to Indonesia has fuelled many discussions 
but is not a new phenomenon. It can be traced back to the eighteenth century 
and continued until the twentieth century. In colonial Indonesia, the Chinese 
labour force was recruited to work in the economic sectors of mining, plantations, 
fisheries and forestry. Unfortunately, previous studies about Chinese society in 
Indonesia more focused on economic and political elites rather than the social 
history of the Chinese contract coolies. This article attempts to look at the labour 
history of the Chinese coolie in the forest exploitation companies, known as 
panglong. By focusing on the ways in which they were treated in  the recruitment 
process and workplace, this article shows that changes for the better did take 
place in the appalling working conditions of the labourers. Until the second 
decade of the twentieth century, recruitment, food, and health care were rife with 
manipulations, exacerbated by arduous working conditions and insecurity in 
the workplace, abuse of power by mandors and forms of non-economic coercion 
like the use of opium. All these factors were meant to ensure that the Chinese 
contract labourers could not break loose from their indentures, a modern form 
of slavery. Hampered by budgetary restrictions, lack of personnel, and marine 
transport facilities, the state colonial officials were hamstrung. But in the second 
decade of twentieth century, when the abysmal working conditions of the 
Chinese coolies were debated on a higher level by politicians and bureauracts 
state control was tightened. More effectual control by the state had a positive 
effect on improving of the working and living conditions.  
Keywords
Chinese labourers; working conditions; state control; forest exploitation; Sumatra.  
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IntroductIon1
The flow of a labour force from China to Indonesia to work on development 
projects funded by Chinese investors in the twenty-first century is phenomenon 
repetition of an old story. A massive influx of Chinese coolies can be traced 
back to the eighteenth century and it continued until the end of the Dutch 
colonial government. Chinese labourers wanting to find job were recruited 
to work in centres of the world capitalist economy in the Southeastern Asian 
region.  Beginning from the southern part of Thailand, crossing the Malay 
Peninsula, jumping to the islands of Bangka-Belitung, and finally to the island 
of Singkep, the Chinese labour force played an important role in production in 
tin-mines (Loh Kok Wah 1988; De Vos 1993: 15; Heidhues 1992). The Chinese 
miners united in a work organization called a kongsi. In colonial Malaya, 
British-owned tin companies were no competition for the Chinese kongsi in 
recruiting a labour supply, especially from southern China (Thoburn 1981: 
5-8). The Chinese labourers were also drawn the gold-mining areas in West 
Kalimantan and the tobacco plantations in East Sumatra (Heidhues 2003; Reid 
1970). Political conflicts like the Opium War in 1842, the Taiping Rebellion 
in 1850, and repeated economic crises and crop failures throughout the 
nineteenth century, all compelled thousands of southern Chinese peasants 
to seek work abroad. The increasing waves of Chinese migration kept pace 
with the development of the world capitalist economy, especially in the outer 
islands after 1870, and reached its apogee at the beginning of twentieth century 
(Touwen 2001; Lindblad 2001: 132-152). As the capitalist economy expanded it 
needed a greater labour force and Chinese people were recruited to work on 
various plantations and for mining companies, both in the outer islands and 
in other region of Southeast Asia. Chinese workers also spread beyond Asia 
to the United States and the Caribbean (Wolf 1982). They enjoyed a reputation 
for diligence and for being experts in mining technology. They also had the 
know-how to make mining equipment. The historical sources reveal that 
Dutch mining engineers could learn from Chinese miners in some respects. 
Up to present time, they still use technical terms derived from the Chinese 
language in mining technology.2
The demand for a Chinese labour force is inextricably linked to the 
problems in recruiting a labour supply from the local people, especially in 
the outer islands. They were not interested in working under contract. The 
combination of low population density and the availability of of land in the 
outer islands offered local people plenty of economic alternatives to decide 
how to pursue their livelihood. With many options to choose from, they 
looked down on working under contract. Naturally, the arrival of Chinese 
labourers to work for mining companies and on plantations had an impact 
on the demographic composition of these areas, especially on Bangka and 
Belitung, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, West Kalimantan, and East Sumatra. 
1 I would like to thank deeply reviewer for his critical comments.
2 One of the Chinese mining technologies used is the palong technology. This  is a standard 
technique for alluvial tin-mining on land. See Sutejo (2015: 363-364). 
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Unfortunately, studies of the social history of Chinese society in Indonesia 
from the perspective of the labour regime are still few and far between. In 
short this field is rather neglected. This article is an attempt to look into 
the conditions of the Chinese labour force in the type of forest exploitation 
company called a panglong.
Although so far, the historiography of labour in Indonesia generally and 
Chinese working class especially has been rather deficient, the history of the 
Chinese working class in the mining sector in Indonesia, especially in West 
Kalimantan, has been discussed in a number of studies. General studies about 
the geography of the kongsis, conflicts between the kongsis and the role of secret 
societies can be found in the works of by James C. Jackson (1970), Wang Tai 
Peng (1977), Mohammad Gade Ismail (1981), and Juan Bingling (2000). Taking 
the perspective of the labour regime, Mary Somers Heidhuis (1992, 2003), an 
expert in Chinese studies of Southeast Asia, focuses on the socio-political and 
economic history of the Chinese tin- and gold-miners in Bangka and West 
Kalimantan. She describes the deplorable working and living conditions of 
the Chinese labourers in the Bangka tin-mines. Anthony Reid (1970) has paid 
attention to the labour of Chinese immigrants in eastern Sumatra.  
More studies have been done on labour history in general, especially 
since the 1980s. Studies on labour history, especially in the outer islands, have 
been written by Jan Breman (1988), Ann Laura Stoler (1985), John Ingelson 
(1986), Vincent Houben (1994), Erwiza Erman (1995, 1999, 2002, 2010), and 
Erwiza Erman and Ratna Saptari (2005). Breman and Stoler focus on labour 
history on eastern Sumatran plantations. Engelson has studied the Javanese 
labourers in Java and Houben paid attention to labour recruitment from Java 
to the outer islands. Breman demonstrates that the fate of the labourers was 
defined by the social relationship between managers and state actors. The most 
interesting findings in Breman’s study are that the colonial state apparatus 
responded differently in its efforts to tackle the bad working conditions on 
the plantations in East Sumatra. Although the issue of working conditions 
was hotly debated among different state actors in the colony, it was finally 
silenced by the Ministry of Colonies. Stoler finds that, in the long run, labour 
conditions were unfree.  
The history of labourers is no longer confined just to the history the 
parameters of production, but it should be linked up to socio-political 
developments in a wider context. Labour politics, whether in the form of 
accommodation or open protest, is inseparable from individual considerations, 
including status, family, ethnicity and culture. Furthermore, labour politics 
was also determined by working conditions and socio-political and economic 
development on a broader level as shown by Stoler.  Studies of labourers in 
the mining sector by Erman (1995, 2005) have proved that the issue of whether 
work and living conditions of labourers were downright appalling or fairly 
reasonable did not depend solely on state control and the social policies of the 
manager and the state, but were also reliant on the background of the labour 
force and on work organizations. The working and living conditions of the 
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Chinese tin-miners on Belitung were far better than those of their counterparts 
on Bangka (Erman 1995). Firstly, the system of numpang allowed them to be 
shareholders. Secondly, they were homogeneous in terms of origin, all of them 
were natives of  the Kayin region. Having the same origin had a positive impact 
on feelings of security and on strengthening feelings of solidarity. In the case 
of the Ombilin coal-mines as studied by Erman (2005), the miners laboured 
in an insecure and unsafe workplace; much of the insecurity attributable 
to the culture of violence embedded in and internalized among the forced 
labourers, most of them political prisoners and criminals. Unsurprisingly, 
the number of labourers who escaped from the mines was very high than it 
was in other places. Studies basically place workers as agents or subjects of 
history who can play an important  role  in the making of history. They are 
no longer regarded as Eric R. Wolf (1982) says as “people without history”, 
but they are people with their own history. 
The studies mentioned above have enriched our knowledge of how we 
should understand work relations and conditions in various sectors of the 
economy. Unquestionably the business schemes of the taukehs, state control, 
and the economic development of a particular commodity were important 
factors in determining the standard of working conditions. However, other 
factors such as  non-economic coercion, the role of the  mandors, the cultural 
background of labourers and the situation in the workplace could also affect 
labour conditions. To argue this point, this article will look at the working 
and living conditions of the Chinese coolies who worked in the type of forest 
exploitation company known as a panglong. Possibly, we can  find similarities 
and differences in the case under study.
What was the history of the panglong in the eastern region of Sumatra? How 
were the Chinese labourers recruited and organized within the framework 
of this sort of company? What were the work and living conditions of the 
labourers really like? In how far did the colonial state control these businesses 
and the working conditions of the Chinese labourers? In theory, the state 
actors should have been a neutral party, standing between the interests of the 
taukehs and labourers. To what extent was the neutral position of the colonial 
state actually discernible in the forest exploitation of panglongs is a question 
which will be answered in this article. It is hoped that this study will fill the 
gap in the history of  labour relations in Chinese businesses in Indonesia. 
As it takes a historical approach, this study has used as its primary 
sources of information archive documents such as Governors-General Decrees 
(Den Besluiten van den Gouverneur Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië, BGG), 
Memoranda written on transfer by a civil servant for his successor (Memorie 
van Overgave), newspapers, and articles. Using primary sources is not without 
problems, because the private motivations of the reporters always has to be 
borne in mind. Documents like the Memorie van Overgave (MvO) written by 
the colonial apparatus in Bengkalis should treated with caution, because they 
have deleted certain pages of the reports, mainly those about the health of 
the Chinese labourers. The excising of certain pages from the reports is proof 
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that the Dutch colonial apparatus felt insecure about informing its readers or 
bosses about  the poor standard of health care of the Chinese labourers and 
their lack of access to public services. Any intimation of a less than satisfactory 
situation could have undermined its reputation. One of the ways to fill the 
lack of information in MvO is to complement them with data taken from the 
reports of the labour inspectors who investigated the  working and living 
conditions of the labourers on the ground.
2. Panglong: chInese taukeh, chInese lAbourers, And worK orgAnIzAtIon
Panglong is a Chinese word: pang is board and long means warehouse. 
Therefore, a panglong is a place used for the storage of either the trees 
which have been felled  to be sawn into planks or for the sawn planks. In 
the nineteenth century, sawmills were quite large, especially those located 
in a very richly forested area in Bengkalis. The trees most often felled were 
meranti, puna, and kelat, considered the best quality for making planks. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, these panglongs had become rare because 
their owners, the taukehs, had moved their sawmills to Singapore. This transfer 
had been prompted because the taukehs want to manage their own businesses 
which were expanding rapidly to meet the high demand of consumers in 
Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, and Hong Kong. Sawn planks were required 
for building wangkang (a sort of coastal vessel), tongkang (river craft), houses, 
furniture, bridges and for other purposes to meet the needs of residents and 
support the physical development of the city of Singapore, cities in the Malay 
Peninsula, and even Hong Kong. The taukehs thought it most efficient to have 
the logs transported to Singapore by wangkangs to be sawn there. Although 
the original kind of panglong had tended to disappear, its designation was 
transferred to forest exploitation companies which felled trees for timber, 
firewood, and charcoal (Pastor 1927: 3; Endert 1932: 270-285). Most of the 
trees which had already been felled for timber were  in Riau Residency, for 
instance, in Siak. The bulk of the wood cut for charcoal had been from the 
mangrove forests located along the low-lying coast in Bengkalis and the Riau-
Lingga Archipelago. The mangrove timber was eminently suitable for making 
charcoal (Boon 1936: 344-373). The panglongs which made charcoal lasted  for 
generations  and some have even remained in business up to present (Genta 
Surianto 2016).
The panglong region covers an area of the islands located in the eastern 
region of Sumatra and some of the adjacent coastline (see Map 1). The most 
important regions were Rupat Island, Bengkalis, Padang, Merbau, Tebing 
Tinggi, Serapang, Mendol, and Rangsang. In the second decade of the twenty 
century, the panglong region extended to the north, taking in Aceh and Jambi 
(De Sumatra Post 10-3-1938). After the forest areas close to Singapore had 
been denuded, the taukehs looked for new areas farther away from Singapore 
or in more remote areas of the eastern region of Sumatra, including Jambi, 
Palembang, East Aceh. 
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Singapore is the most important international trading port in Southeast 
Asia. It had grown in size and importance after Thomas Stamford Raffles 
founded the modern city in the early nineteenth century. Proximity to 
Singapore was the most important factor in the emergence of forest exploitation 
panglongs in the eastern region of Sumatra. Singapore itself is very small and 
never had a forested area sufficient to fulfil consumers’ demands for wood. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to say when panglongs were first established. 
Reports by VOC (Dutch East India Company) officials mentioned that wood 
was one of the items of trade exported from the eastern region of Sumatra 
to Malacca, Penang, and Singapore. A study by Timothy Barnard (1998: 88) 
has shown that timber from the sultanate of Siak had been recorded since 
the seventeenth century, but it was only in the nineteenth century that it 
began to be referred to as panglong. The sultan of Siak and the sultan of Riau-
Lingga issued licences to the Singaporean Chinese taukehs. According to the 
calculations made by A.F.P. Graafland, a colonial officer who served in the 
Karimun Islands, the first panglongs were found in areas in the near vicinity, 
for instance, on the islands of Bintan, Batam, and Karimun around the 1860s 
and 1870s (Graafland 1888: 395). The Dutch colonial government signed a 
contracts with the sultan of Siak on 16 July 1873 (BGG 1873 no. 22) and again 
on 4 February 1879, which was reconfirmed on 18 October  1881, 9 April 1895, 
and then on 18 June 1895. 
The entire content of the contract was reiterated, most importantly the 
provision specifying the right of taxation ceded by the sultan of Siak to the 
Dutch colonial government for the island of Bengkalis. Its territory extended 
Map 1. Map of panglongs in eastern region of Sumatra (map by the author).
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to between one to ten kilometres of coastline, ranging from Panei up to 
Palalawan. Besides Palalawan, the panglong region also included Penyalijan, 
Lebu, Serampong, Sungai Kaluwang, Tugauw, Sungai Kaladi, and Tonggaw. 
It also extended to Tanjung Ongka in Indragiri and the forest area around 
the Kampar River, extending 50 kilometres inland from the coastline. The 
panglong area in the territory of the sultan of Riau-Lingga was located to the 
south, namely: the islands of Lingga and Singkep. According to reports of the 
Labour Inspector for the year 1925/1926, there were fifty kinds trees felled 
by the panglongs in the mangrove forests for processing into charcoal which 
was exported to Singapore. At that time there were only three panglongs 
felling logs operating in the islands of Lingga. The felled areas which had 
been cleared were planted with gambier, apart from the area cultivated by the 
Malay and Buginese peasants, offered a promising business opportunity to 
Chinese taukehs from Singapore. From the data released by the Forest Service 
of the colonial government, it is known that there were 2,000,000 hectare of 
panglongs in Bengkalis and Riau in 1930. These panglongs produced 400,000 
cubic metres of timber, and a large amount of firewood and charcoal.
Many kinds of trees were felled by these panglongs. As said the trees from 
the mangroves were the best for charcoal. Therefore, the charcoal panglongs 
were concentrated in the region of the mangrove forests along the coast. 
Barnard’s study shows that in the region of the Siak sultanate alone nineteen 
kinds of trees were exported to Penang and Singapore to build ships, which 
would be seaworthy for up to forty-five years (Barnard 1998: 88). There 
were 160 kinds of trees in all, and forty species were felled by the panglong 
companies. Consequently, the longer the panglongs operated, the more kinds 
of trees which disappeared from the rich forests. This data is proof that the 
deforestation began a long time ago. 
As explained earlier, the owner of a panglong was a taukeh, who usually 
resided in Singapore. The Panglong Regulation (in Dutch, the Panglong 
Reglement) states that the taukeh had to have a licence from the local authorities, 
the sultans Siak or Riau-Lingga, to fell trees within an area which should not 
be more than 500 hectares. Licence rights could not be valid for less than one 
year and, if it was extended, for no more than five years. A licence stipulated 
that a taukeh had to look for suitable forest areas to be felled, but only after 
previously consulting the local people, particularly the Orang Utan, the Orang 
Laut, and the Orang Akik who had an unrivalled knowledge of the forest 
areas and good trees (Barnard 1998: 89). They would be paid for their services 
in Singaporean dollars. In fact, the taukeh rarely bothered about this licence. 
The taukeh would delegate authority to persons whom he trusted to manage 
his panglong, while he remained in Singapore to run his business. At certain 
times, the taukeh would send funds, Chinese labourers and their daily basic 
needs to the panglong area on board one of his own wangkangs and tongkangs.
Table 1 shows the development of various kinds of panglong in Bengkalis 
from 1893 up to 1927. From 1893-1898, the number of panglong for the sawmills 
had grown from 35 in 1893 to 52 in 1898, but then dropped dramatically to 
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fourteen in 1903. By 1924, the sawmill panglong had disappeared from the 
region of Bengkalis, because, as said above, the taukehs had shifted their 
companies to Singapore, where sawmills were needed to produce the planks 
need for making furniture, building houses, and similar uses. The timber-
felling panglongs began to be established in 1893 and they increased to 97 in 
subsequent years. Although their numbers began to decline in 1923, they rose 
again to 80 up to 1927. The firewood panglongs were essential to meeting the 
basic needs of Singaporean households and businessmen. They began to be 
built in 1898 and their number had reached 85 in 1922. Mirroring the fate of the 
sawmills, during the economic recession in 1922-1923, their number decreased 
dramatically to just sixteen in 1927.  The expansion of the charcoal panglongs 
was spectacular, increasing from only four in 1893 to 80 in the period 1920-
1922, but in 1923 their number dropped to twelve. After the recession, their 
number rose again to 68 in 1925. The recession caused a dramatic fall in all 
kinds of panglongs. The reason was the drop consumer purchasing power and 
the closure of panglongs by the government  for violating various contractual 
provisions in the area of Bengkalis (Pastor 1927: 40).
Year Wooden 
boards
Timber 
wood
Fire wood Charcoal Total
1893 35 18 - 4 57
1896 40 37 - 7 84
1898 52 34 30 15 131
1903 14 86 29 41 170
1913 11 97 46 62 216
1920 4 90 60 83 237
1921 2 86 55 85 228
1922 1 86 85 85 257
1923 1 63 42 12 118
1924 - 68 44 16 128
1925 - 57 28 76 161
1926 - 69 25 28 122
1927 - 80 16 69 165
3
Unfortunately, the data on panglong development in the residency of Riau 
is unobtainable, with the exception of two years, from 1925 to 1927. This is 
a period in which the Dutch colonial government began to intervene more 
3 Source: Taken from the calculation made by Labour Inspector (G. Pastor) and from MvO 
(A. Te Velde, onderafdeling Selat Panjang 25-1-1926: 28-29). In 1893, data taken only from 
panglongs areas located  under the authority of the sultanate of Siak.
Table 1. Total number of panglongs in Afdeling Bengkalis (1893-1927).3
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strongly to try to improve the unfavourable working conditions of the Chinese 
labourers. Table 2 shows that there were only three kinds of panglongs in 
the Residency of Riau.The largest produced charcoal. In 1925 the number of 
firewood and charcoal panglongs was only 203, but they had increased again 
to 235 in 1927.
             
Kinds of panglong
Number of panglongs at Residency of Riau
1925 1926 1927
Timber logs 20 21 20
Firewood 17 23 21
Charcoal 166 171 194
Total number 203 215 235
4
The growth in the number of panglong in Bengkalis and the Residency of Riau 
stagnated, especially during the depression of the 1930s. This worldwide 
economic catastrophe impacted drastically on the purchasing power of 
consumers. 
The establishment of various kinds of panglongs led to the creation of 
Chinese communities in various forest areas in Bengkalis and the Residency 
of Riau. The Chinese people employed in panglongs were all single men from 
different sub-ethnic groups. They were recruited from the Chinese labour 
market in Singapore. The most famous place at which they were recruited 
was the “kedeh nasi” or foodstalls. These stalls served a dual function. They 
not only sold food but were also a meeting place at which Chinese job-seekers 
could look for employment in Singapore itself or outside. These job-seekers 
had only the clothes they stood up in. They had no place to stay or money to 
cover their cost of living. The Chinese taukehs knew exactly where they should 
be looking for a labour force for the panglongs. To do the actual recruitment the 
taukehs used brokers to whom they offered a competitive reward. Usually, the 
brokers were already well informed about what they needed to do to entice 
job-seekers into accepting their tempting offers. The brokers did their best to 
hide the location of the workplace, especially if that company happened to 
have a bad reputation among the labourers. Generally, the brokers dangled 
carrots like good working conditions and high wages. Therefore, the job-
seekers almost never knew the location of the workplace or remained ignorant 
of the real working conditions. The pattern of labour recruitment was similar 
to that found among the Chinese labourers working in Deli and Bangka, but 
differed from that in Belitung (Erman 1995: 107-120; Reid 1970) After their 
arrival at the workplace, the disillusioned job seekers very often tried to escape 
from the panglong as soon as they possibly could.
4 Source: MvO (A. Te Velde, onderafdeling Selat Panjang 25-1-1926).
Table 2. Total number of panglongs in the Residency of Riau, 1925-1927.4
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The Chinese brokers were known as “tukang jual orang” (the traders in 
human beings), a term which neatly sums up their bad reputation in the 
eyes of the labourers. These brokers competed with each other in “selling” 
information to representatives of plantation, mining, and fishing companies 
who came to Singapore to recruit a labour force. The panglong taukehs  gave this 
job to a person they believed could make good deals with the representatives. 
If the Chinese people agreed to work, they had to sign a contract in the front 
of officials from the Office of the  Chinese Protectorate. Signing the contract 
meant they considered themselves already to have been “sold for three years”. 
Most labourers were illiterate and did not understand the contents of the 
contract and were unaware of their rights and obligations. They even did not 
know where they would have to go to in Sumatra and what they would have 
to do in the workplace (De Sumatra Post 22-8-1906). 
The Chinese labourers in the panglongs came from various backgrounds. 
They were Hoklo, Hakka, Hailam, Teotjoe, Leotjo, and the Chinese people 
from Macao known as Kongfoe people. Most taukehs were either Hokkien or 
Cantonese (Bruin 1918: 88). Heterogeneity in ethnicity and variation in dialects 
affected labour relations in panglongs. Misscommunications between labourers 
from different ethnic groups flared up frequently and they were also the 
touch-paper for individual conflicts between laboureres from different ethnic 
groups. The exception were the Chinese labourers from Macao who worked 
together in the same workplace. They felt secure and individual conflicts were 
rare occurrences (Pastor 1927: 3).    
The Chinese labourers lived a kongsi house. Unfortunately information 
about their daily life there is not easy to come by. Before leaving for the 
workplace, the labourers were paid money in advance by the taukeh. The sum 
varied from 10 to 100 (Singapore) dollars per person. This money was used 
to purchase various essential items like clothing, sunhats and the like and 
to cover their cost of living during the time they had to spend in Singapore 
before they were taken to the panglong area by tongkang. All these items were 
sold by the owner of the panglong at a price higher than the market rate and 
was consequently soon spent. The advance was noted by the taukeh as a debt 
which had to be repaid by labourers soon after they received their first wage 
packet. Later it will emerge how very difficult it was for labourers to repay 
the debt. The amount of the debt had often increased after they had worked 
off more than three years of their contract. Mainly because the taukeh added 
other non-economic forms of coercion like selling opium to the labourers.
The taukehs of panglongs had to purchase entry permits at the emigration 
offices located  on Sambu Island, Bengkalis, and Selat Panjang. Although the 
entry permit was paid by  the taukeh, later it would be deducted from wages. 
This permit was not kept by the labourers, but by the head of the Chinese 
village, a precaution to prevent labourers escaping. However, an observation 
by a labour inspector on 11 July 1925, remarks that there were still 24 labourers 
without entry permits in Panglong no. 6 in Sungai Batang. In other cases, the 
entry permit had the picture of another labourer. This is stark proof of the 
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manipulation of data about the labourers. The labour inspector thought that, 
since there were many cases of corruption to do with entry permits, there 
was some sort of cover-up to conceal labourers who were working at the 
panglong illegally. The photo in the permit was also important to the colonial 
government, especially in solving the frequent murder cases which occured 
in panglongs. One example is the case of  Leong Heng, a former foreman who 
did not work in the panglong, but acted as a foreman and killed a Chinese 
labourer there. He had changed his name to Leong Fok. In another case, Koh 
Fok Tjoeng, who worked in Panglong no. 4 in Sungai Tjontjong, Indragiri 
Hilir, had a residence permit card without a photo in the name of Lim Djioe 
(Pastor 1927: 44).
Unfortunately, we have no data which would give some idea of the number 
of Chinese labourers throughout the period under study. The composition of 
the Chinese labour force differed from one panglong to another, a fact of which 
the Dutch officials were very well aware. The Assistant-Resident of Bengkalis 
noted that there were twenty labourers working in a sawmill panglong, ten for 
firewood, and five for charcoal. W.J. Beck from the Labour Inspectorate said 
that number of labourers employed in timber-getting varied between twenty 
to sixty people. In 1906, the Resident of Riau reported around 120 labourers 
at work sawing timber (Pastor 1927: 47).  
The lack of information on the exact number of the Chinese labourers was 
a constant source of irritation to the Dutch officials from the late nineteenth to 
the second half of the twentieth century. The reasons are several. The scattered 
location of panglongs made them difficult for officials, who had limited marine 
transportation and few personnel, to reach. Therefore, it was imposibble for 
them to check panglongs by crossing from island to island or by penetrating 
dense forests. Nevertheless, visiting panglongs was important, because the 
Dutch colonial government had did have an economic and social interest in 
both tax collection and the social protection of labourers. For his part, the head 
of a panglong would provide false information on the number of his labour 
force to evade taxation.  The heads of panglongs  would hide Chinese labourers 
in the forest when the government officials visited the kongsi house. Table 3 
gives a rough estimate of the number of labourers working in panglongs in 
Afdeeling (District) Selat Panjang, Bengkalis for the period 1917-1925. 
The number of labourers was quite high at around 4,000 for the year 1917-
1918. But the  figures tended to decline in the following years. As far as can be 
gleaned from the sparse information available, this number decreased from 
1,950 in 1924 to 1,350 in 1925. The decrease in the number of labourers was 
the result of a stringent control introduced by the colonial government, in 
particular the labour inspectors and the local police who had closed panglongs 
which violated the regulations. Labourers who had completed their contracts 
and did not want to extend them should be sent back to Singapore by the 
taukeh, as stipulated in the Panglong Regulation.
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Year Number of Labourers Year Number of Labourers
1917 4,000 1921 2,642
1918 4,000 1922 Not available
1919 3,361 1923 Idem
1920 2,728 1924 1,950
1925 1,330
5
Basically, the work organization in a panglong did not differ very much 
from that in other places such as tin- and gold-mines, which were also worked 
mainly with Chinese labourers. One striking difference in panglongs was the 
absence of the owner of the capital and the conditions in the workplace. The 
absence of the real owners provided opportunities for the heads of panglongs, 
mandors, and their allies to abuse their power to make their own profit from 
the panglong business. These abuses were exacerbated by the scattered nature 
of the workplaces, isolated on various islands which made them difficult for 
the state colonial government to control.
Most of the taukehs were also uncertain about their exact location. The 
owners simply monitored their businesses through the nakhoda (skippers) of 
their wangkang or tongkang who transported the Chinese people and their basic 
necessities to the panglongs. On their return voyage, the taukeh received the 
timber, firewood, and charcoal which were transported to Singapore on the 
vessels. The taukehs usually had their fingers in many pies. In Singapore the 
panglong products would be exported to various places, including the Malay 
Peninsula, Siam, British India, Hong Kong, and Japan. By diversifying his 
business, the taukeh could minimize the negative effects of any price decrease 
in a commodity. For example, a taukeh might open a gambier plantation after 
closing a panglong. So, if one business collapsed, the taukeh would not suffer 
drastic losses, because another one was there to subsidize it. There were only 
two taukehs who lived on and personally managed their panglongs. They were 
Lam Tin and Jan Jau, who had a number of panglongs in Indragiri Hilir and 
Mandah. They were large-scale, succesful exporters who supplied firewood 
to Hong Kong in the second decade of the twentieth century (Pastor 1927: 3).
The taukehs delegated authority to manage the production process to a 
person who was appointed the head of the panglong. When he chose the head, 
the taukeh would also select some people to be foremen or mandors, whose 
taks was to oversee the work group. The number of members of the group 
varied according to the type of panglong. A timber panglong might have twenty 
labourers, who had to fell trees and transport the logs to the edge of a river or 
to coastal areas to be loaded into a wangkang. A charcoal panglong could be 
worked by five to ten labourers. When a panglong was opened, the labourers 
5 Source: MvO (A. Te Velde, onderafdeling Selat Panjang 25-1-1926: 30).
Table 3:  Total Number of Chinese Coolies in Afdeling Selat Panjang, Bengkalis, 
1917-1925.5
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had to provide their own facilities by constructing a kongsi house for the head, 
the foremen, and themselves. A kongsi house consisted of a place of worship, 
a kitchen, and a long dormitory to accomodate many labourers. Water was 
fetched from nearby rivers and the swamps in the areas surrounding the 
kongsi house. The construction of a kongsi house in the middle of the forest 
created a Chinese community who created small villages scattered around 
the locations of the panglongs. The area around the kongsi house was planted 
with vegetable to supply basic necessities. Despite a supply of vegetables, the 
degree of dependence on the supply of basic goods from Singapore was high.
3. worKIng condItIons of the lAbourers And stAte control
In 1893 the Dutch colonial government in Batavia was shocked by the sharp 
comments made by the Chinese Protectorate Officer. In his letter, this official 
commented that the conditions of Chinese labourers in panglongs were terrible, 
akin to slavery. Nevertheless, it took the Dutch colonial government three years 
to react to these blistering comments by forming an investigation team which 
consisted of the Resident of East Sumatra, the Assistant-Resident of Bengkalis, 
and the local police to investigate what was really going in panglongs. The 
results of investigation can be said to have been a failure as far as improving 
labour conditions was concerned. However, the letter which sounded the 
warning marked momentous year, one in which the Dutch government did 
begin to pay attention to the working conditions in panglongs. 
From that time, the colonial government seized the initiative to check on 
panglongs more strictly and to improve the living conditions of the Chinese 
labourers. To do so it issued a set of regulations governing labour relations, 
the rights and obligations of the taukehs and labourers. When push came to 
shove, efforts to enforce this control were beset with difficulties, because the 
Dutch colonial government was hampered by both budgetary squeezes and 
lack of personnel, and was restricted in its access to marine transport facilities. 
This section will focus on the working conditions of the Chinese labourers 
and checks on the panglongs by  the Dutch colonial government.
The monitoring of the working conditions of the Chinese labourers in 
panglongs fell under the aegis of both the British colonial government in 
Singapore and the Dutch colonial government in Batavia. The contract had 
to be signed in the Chinese Protectorate Office under the British colonial 
government. As its name implies, this office served to protect the Chinese 
labourers recruited in Singapore but employed under the legal system of 
the Dutch colonial government. R.N. Jackson, who worked in the Chinese 
Protectorate Office, was an English official who paid great attention to the 
fate of Chinese labourers in the nineteenth century (Jackson 1965). 
The sharp criticisms emanating from this office were made after the Dutch 
colonial government had completed drafting the labour regulations known 
as the Coolie Ordinances in 1880. These regulations were initially issued by 
the colonial government with the intention of giving employers rather than 
the labourers more protection, their chief purpose being to prevent labour 
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shortages. The eventually these labour regulations were rounded off in 1889 
and in them the government gave equal weight to the interests of employers 
and labourers (Tjoeng Tin Fong 1947: 63-65).
The biting comment about bad working conditions in panglongs was 
made by the Chinese Protectorate Office when colonial officials in Batavia 
were trying to get a better grip on labourers in the colony. In practice, the 
control exercised by the colonial government was not as straightforward 
as people thought. Theoretically the labour regulations, as the legal basis 
to control working conditions in the colony, were intended to work as they 
had functioned in the East Sumatra, but it was not all plain sailing. The root 
of the problem was the inadequacy of any modern bureaucractic planning 
for the outer islands (Endert 1932: 270-285). In fact a number of branches of 
the colonial bureaucracy were involved in efforts to rectify the bad working 
conditions in panglongs: the Resident and Assistant-Resident, officials of the 
Labour Inspectorate and of the Forestry Offices in the outer islands, including 
in Sumatra. The Labour Inspectorate was established at the beginning of 
twentieth century, at a time when forestry offices was still just being set up, 
especially in the panglong areas (Van Braam 1919: 336–350; Boon 1936: 344-
373). The intricacies of all these circumstances were compounded by a lack 
of money, personnel, and marine transport facilities. Undoubtedly these 
shortcomings were destabilizing factors in efforts to exercise more effective 
control over the panglong businesses and ameliorating labour conditions.
The Dutch colonial government responded to the negative comments 
made by the Chinese Inspectorate by establishing a commission of enquiry 
chaired by the Resident of East Sumatra. The task of the commission was 
to investigate the validity of the official report of the Chinese Protectorate. 
Many difficulties were pinpointed during the investigation, hurdles like the 
isolated location of panglongs and their inaccessibility and the fact they were 
closed off from the outside world. Only the skippers of tongkangs knew their 
locations and could access them. Importantly, the investigators reported that 
the Chinese labourers were burdened by enormous debts. Many labourers 
had tried to escape their workplaces several times, in an attempt to evade 
the arduous working conditions. Unfortunately, most of the escapees did not 
succeed and were brought back by Malays who would be rewarded for their 
capture (De Bruin 1918: 50-51). The authors of the report surmised that the 
only opportunity Chinese labourers would have to escape would be if they 
worked together to mutiny against the skippers of the tongkangs. 
The colonial state benefited from the purchase of the entry permits and 
from the tax collected on the products exported by panglongs. The observation 
made by J.A. van Rijn van Alkemade in 1897, when he travelled from Siak to 
Palalawan, reveals that the sultan of Siak received half a dollar from every 
Chinese coolie who worked in a panglong (Van Rijn van Alkemade 1897: 118). 
After Siak signed a contract in which it submitted to Dutch rule in 1857, the 
authority to collect this tax was handed over to the Dutch government. In 1932, 
the amount  the Dutch colonial government collected from the timber exported 
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amounted to f 1,000,000 (Endert 1932: 274). These businesses proved lucrative 
to the Dutch colonial government until the world economic depression of the 
1930s. Taxes from timber production decreased for the period 1927-1932 as 
the number of panglongs was reduced. Many panglongs closed because timber 
prices continued to decline as demand for timber dropped (Van Bodegom 
1932: 259).
In the early years of twentieth century, the problem of the working 
and living conditions of labourers was a heated topic of discussion among 
government officials and politicians in Batavia, in meetings of the Volksraad 
(the colonial Parliament) and sessions of the Dutch Lower House. In short, 
there was a general and recurrent debate about contract labour and the 
negative effect it had on labour conditions, which is discussed at some length 
by Breman (1989) and Erman in the Ombilin coal-mines (Erman 2002). In his 
analysis of labour conditions, Lindblad (1989: 1-23) has directed his arguments 
towards the economic motives behind modern Dutch imperialism. Vincent 
Houben (1994) has focused on the “profit versus ethics” debate. These 
discussions finally effectuated state colonial intervention, most visibly present 
in the establishment the Labour Inspectorate. Unquestionably, the case of the 
panglongs fits into the context of the “profit versus ethics” controvery as will 
be discussed below. 
Although the panglong issue was a part of a broader debate among state 
actors from various state colonial institutions, the person who had the greatest 
effect was the journalist Matthijs Vierhout who really did influence the social 
policy of the colonial government.  The  discussion about the panglongs was set 
off by what Vierhout published in the newspaper De Locomotif entitled ”Recht 
en Link” (Right and Left), re-published in the newspaper De Soematra Post 
under the title of “Panglong-koelies” (De Sumatra Post 22-8-1906). The results 
of his investigations in the Riau Lingga Archipelago presented irrefutable 
proof that the conditions of the Chinese labourers were abysmal. Their wages 
were low. All the cash advanced by the taukeh had been spent on purchasing 
what they needed from stores supplied by taukeh at prices far higher than they 
would have had to pay in the market. This factor was completely separate 
from the abuse of power by the heads and foremen of panglongs. The report 
stated that the Malay sultanate of Riau-Lingga (Inlandsche zelfbestuur) received 
an unusually high income from the concessions it granted the Chinese taukehs. 
He added a critical addendum to the report pointing out that was impossible 
for the Dutch government to control such activities because it simply did 
not have either enough marine transport or personnel. This comment was 
repeatedly raised by officials who visited the panglong areas subsequently. 
Low-ranking officials had only a sailing boat to assist them in performing 
their duties. This outmoded form of transport hampered their ability to reach 
the scattered islands. Nature did not help either, as the area of, for instance, 
Natuna  was notorious for its heavy surf. One of the major proposals to ensure 
the introduction of good governance in the panglong region was the absolute 
necessity to provide fast government motor vessels. Unfortunately arguably 
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less government attention was paid to this suggestion, so that the smuggling 
of Chinese labourers and opium on tongkangs which could easily reach the 
panglong continued pretty unhindered. It was the same story with the panglongs 
in Riau Residency. It was ironic, according to the author in summing up his 
report, that many expeditions from Batavia to the outer islands did use fast, 
more sophisticated  vessels. However, as the government did not have enough 
budget, his suggestion remained a pipe-dream.
Vierhout’s report reached the Ministry of Colonies in the Hague. Minister 
of Colonies Van Kol was aware of the bad working conditions being hotly 
discussed throughout the length and breadth of the Netherlands Indies, 
especially in the mining and plantation regions located in East Sumatra, 
Bangka, Ombilin-Sawahlunto, and in Bengkulu, which included the panglong 
areas. Therefore, he suggested that the governor-general send an official from 
the Inspectorate of Labour to investigate the panglongs. In 1907, D.C. Stibbe 
was assigned the task of investigating the working and living conditions of 
the Chinese labourers in Bengkalis and the Riau Residency. The results of his 
investigation tallied with those in Vierhout’s report. Therefore, he seconded 
Vierhout’s suggestion for the necessity of tighter control of the panglongs by 
the Dutch government. In addition to providing a faster patrol boats, that 
is, motorboats, he suggested a watch-post manned by a policeman and the 
construction of a hospital (Javasche Courant 14, 17-5-1907). In 1908, the Dutch 
colonial government issued a regulation called the Panglong Reglement 
which among other matters required the taukehs provide Chinese labourers 
with adequate food and medical services (Staatsblad 1908 no. 448). The 
implementation of this regulation gave the Dutch colonial government the 
authority to keep an eye on those owners of panglongs who tend to neglect 
the working and living conditions of the Chinese labourers.
In practice, the regulations issued by the government to protect the Chinese 
labourers fell far short of expectations. One piece of evidence is gleaned from 
the health conditions of the labourers. In 1913, the number of patients treated 
in the panglong hospital in Selat Panjang was fairly numerous, 291 patients 
in all; 58 of them suffering from beriberi, twelve of whom died. In 1914 the 
number of patients treated increased to 363 people, 103 of them afflicted by 
beriberi. The mortality rate increased to 22 people. Consequently, J. Snellen 
van Vollenhoven from the office of Het Chineesche Zaken in Batavia visited 
ten panglongs in Bengkalis and the Riau Residency in late 1918 and again in 
early 1919. The two reports written by Van Vollenhoven tell the same story, 
confirming the previous findings of colonial officials. The list was long: fraud 
in labour recruitment, opium addiction among the labourers and their the debt 
entanglements, which meant that they could not extricate themselves from 
their contracts within the period of three years (Pastor 1927: 33). The Chinese 
labourers struggled in appalling working and living conditions, having to 
put, up with inadequate food, primitive shelters in the middle of the forest 
and no clean drinking water.
These issues were crucial stressed Van Vollenhoven and other Dutch 
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government officials. The next issue raised was of the Chinese labourers 
seemingly bound in perpetuity to the panglongs, far beyond the three years 
stipulated in their contracts. They had been landed in this quagmire by the 
taukehs. By selling opium to the labourers, the latter were actually exerting 
non-economic coercion which could leave the Chinese labourers dependent 
on opium. At first, smoking the drug was just a process of trial and error for 
the new arrivals. However, over time, they were hooked, partly socially by 
wanting not to be left out, and partly medically because the opium itself was 
addictive. So much so that eventually users wanted to smoke it continuously. 
The use of opium by the Chinese labourers varied from 1 to 6 mata6 a day per 
person according to the report by a panglong head. However, the real extent 
of opium consumption is difficult to assess. For example, the data collected 
by the Dutch officials  covers only the amount of opium imported officially, 
but large quantities of opium were smuggled from Singapore to the panglongs 
on tongkangs. The lack control by the Dutch colonial officials and their access 
to limited marine transportation meant it was impossible to prevent the 
smuggling of either opium or labourers from Singapore. Many years passed 
and it was only in August 1924 that the government could intercept the 
smuggling of opium in large quantities carried to Bengkalis on tongkangs 
(Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 16-8-1924). 
These issues were all raised in reports submitted by government officials 
in the years which followed. Further evidence is provided by the large number 
of complaints made by the Chinese labourers to a Dutch Official, translator for 
the Chinese language. These complaints reveal that most of labourers could 
not return to Singapore because they were still in debt to the head of their 
panglong. The misery is also in evidence in similar narratives about the bad 
conditions of Chinese labourers noted by Van Vollenhoven. These give plenty 
of examples of the stark insecurity of their working conditions. For example, 
on 13 July 1915, a case was brought before the Landraad. A foreman had 
bound a labourer to a millstone and then whipped him repeatedly, so badly 
in fact he died. The labourer had worked in the panglong for three months and 
he had already tried to escape three times. His third attempt had also been 
unsuccessful, because a Malay rower who collaborated with the head of the 
panglong had brought him back to his foreman (Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 16-08-
1924). On 10 October 1916, a labourer tried to escape from his panglong for the 
second time unable to endure the terrible working conditions. He managed to 
reach the sea shore and wanted to escape to a village located on the banks of 
the Kateman river. But then his luck ran out, because a Malay fisherman, the 
owner of the sampan,  wanted to take him back to the workplace.  The owner 
of the sampan could collect a reward of 3 dollars for a labourer returned to 
the panglong. Another sad story happened in Panglong no. 33 in Bengkalis. 
There was one labourer suffering from leprosy, six people had been seriously 
injured and another had been killed. Some others had been abandoned in a 
hut in the woods because of severe injuries to several parts of their bodies.
6 1 mata = 1,28 gram.
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Van Vollenhoven’s reports record in detail plenty of appalling stories about 
the living conditions of the Chinese labourers. After discovering many cases of 
bad working conditions of Chinese labourers in panglongs, Van Vollenhoven 
finally asked why the labour inspectors did not do anything about them. He 
also criticized the attitude of the colonial government which prioritized savings 
in the government budget and chose to ignore the bad working and living 
conditions of the labourers. Van Vollenhoven ended his report by saying that 
the best way to abolish slave-like conditions in the panglong would be to post 
the competent officials to Bengkalis and  the Riau Residency.
Despite the urgence of his message, the colonial government in Batavia 
did not address the issue immediately. In fact, it took  five years to arrive at 
a decision. Its sluggish response to this issue might be in part attributable to 
the political and economic conditions during and after the First World War. 
This conflict had a negative impact on the marketing of products from the 
Netherlands Indies on the international market. Another reason was closely 
related to the ongoing formation but still incomplete structure of the Dutch 
colonial bureaucracy in the outer islands. Nevertheless, some Dutch officials 
were posted to the panglong areas where it was their duty to halt any activities 
which violated the regulations, including the smuggling of Chinese labourers 
and opium, not meeting their social obligations towards their labourers and 
abuse of power by foremen. As said, to eradicate these violations, sufficient 
marine transportation and personnel were absolute necessities. And this 
required a healthy budget. However, allowing these abuses to continue 
was just as detrimental to the Dutch colonial government itself, because its 
economic interests were being undermined. Production might stagnate if 
large number of Chinese labourers felt compelled to try to escape. Working 
and living conditions were insecure, not least because of threats posed by 
the natural environment. The Chinese labourers both in the forest and in the 
kongsi house itselfwere frequently attacked by tigers or by crocodiles in the 
swamps and rivers. Stories of these attacks on the labourers became daily 
news in the panglong areas (De Indische Courant 29-6-1932; De Sumatra Post 
5-11-1935). The feelings of insecurity among the labourers in kongsi houses 
were aggravated by robberies perpetrated by local residents. One such case of 
robbery was carried out by Pak Manap and his gang in the panglong located 
in Bubalan, Pangkalan Berandan in 1911. This band of thugs robbed the 
labourers of their clothes, money and all their basic necessities. Robberies in 
the panglongs attracted the attention of various journalists and even of the 
governor-general in Batavia (Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 
1-3-1911, 25-4-1911; Algemeen Handelsblad 17-4-1912; De Telegraaf 3-4-1911; De 
Sumatra Post 6-5-1911; De Tĳd 17-4-1912).
The slow response of the Dutch colonial government to address the issue 
of insecurity in panglongs was criticized and debated by politicians in the 
colonial House of Representatives, the Volksraad, in 1923. Members of the 
Volksraad had questioned the issue of the bad working and living conditions 
of the labourers in meetings in Batavia. One of these politicians was Haji 
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Agus Salim. He recalled some of his childhood experiences in 1904 and 1905 
when he had accompanied his father and four police inspectors on a visit to 
investigate criminal cases which had occurred in panglongs. Haji Agus Salim 
closed his speech by describing the fate of the Chinese labourers as “their 
souls have been sold for thirteen rupiah and half” Pastor 1927: 37).
The sharp criticism of the members of the Volksraad in the second 
decade of twentieth century did have positive impact on the improvement 
of working and living conditions of the labourers, especially under a liberal 
Governor-General Dirk De Fock. This was a period in which many socio-
political organizations such as Sarekat Islam and the Indonesian Communist 
Party were finding their feet and becoming more articulate. Hence the Dutch 
colonial government began to pay more attention to violations of labour 
regulations. There is little cause to doubt that the Dutch government was 
aware of the abominable labour relations in panglongs. Therefore, it formulated 
a policy of setting up a co-operative supervision of cross-sectoral government 
institutions, especially between the labour inspectorate, forestry, the police, 
and the heads of sub-districts and residencies. In 1924, the Labour Inspectorate 
opened branch offices in Tanjung Pinang and Bengkalis. These branch offices 
made the task of checking more efficient than it had been before. To make 
their supervision of the panglong areas as effective as possible, the officials 
of the Labour Inspectorate cooperated with policemen and officials from the 
Forestry Service whose task was to patrol the forest areas in such places as 
Tanjung Pinang, Selat Panjang, Penuba, Karimun, and Tembilahan. In the 
Forestry Service, each official had the task of overseeing five or six panglongs. 
So that they could work efficiently, the Dutch colonial government provided 
funding for the purchase of a steamer and several motor boats which could 
be used in carrying out their duties (BGG 7-5-1923 no. 50). 
In the first half of 1925, the Dutch colonial government increased funding 
for the provision of marine transport facilities. It purchased more motor boats 
for the officials, hoping that this would made checking in the panglong areas 
more effective. Since the beginning of 1927, the labour inspector in Riau had 
had a motorboat the “Datoe” at his disposal (BGG 28-12-1926 no. 24). In 1925, 
a translator for the Chinese language had been posted to the branch office 
of the Labour Inspectorate in Tanjung Pinang and, in 1925, an official from 
the Labour Inspectorate was stationed in Bengkalis (Gouvernements-Secretarie 
3-7-1925 no. 1250/II A2). After the appointment of this Dutch official, the 
Head of the Labour Inspectorate in Batavia, A.G. Vreede, felt optimistic about 
improvements to the controlling of panglong areas and the Chinese labourers 
(Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 27-8-1925). In 1925, the Resident of Riau set up a 
panglong ziekenfonds (health insurance scheme), of which a Chinese taukeh 
would be one of the members in Tanjung Pinang, Batam, Karimun, Penuba, 
and Tembilahan. The foundation of the panglong ziekenfonds was intended to 
ensure that the Chinese labourers working in panglongs would have proper 
access to health care.
Stricter control of panglongs by the colonial government can be seen in the 
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rules it issued. The most important was that the head of the local government, 
be he an Assistant-Resident or Resident, was entitled to terminate the operating 
licence of a panglong, if: 1) the taukeh or his representative in the panglong act 
arbitrarily and ill treated the labourers; 2) the licensee of the panglong did not 
provide good housing, adequate food, and health care for the coolies; 3) the 
licensee of panglong did not pay wages on time should be noted in a wage 
book; 4) the licensees of the panglong committed habitual violations of all the 
rules issued by the government. How far these rules were observed by the 
taukehs and to what extent the government  could enforce the law on panglong 
owners who violated the rules above, can be seen in the following example.
Besides the widening of the scope of the colonial bureaucracy and the 
tighter government control on the panglongs, there are other changes, especially 
in the ways in which the labour inspectors investigated the data collected. 
Earlier data from surveys  carried out by officials who had preceded Van 
Vollenhoven turned out to be pretty useless, because much of it had been 
falsified by the heads of panglongs. Compounding the damage caused by data 
falsification, the Chinese labourers were also scared to disclose the problems 
they had to face including late payment of wages, lack of food and water 
and the insecurity threatening their way of life to the labour inspectors. They 
feared punishment by the foremen. In order to collect information from the 
labourers as much as possible, the labour inspectors did not inform the time 
of their investigation to the head of panglong. Labour Inspectorate officials, 
policemen and forestry officials no longer visited the kongsi houses as they 
had done in previous years. 
The investigation team went directly to the panglong area in the middle of 
the forest and interviewed the Chinese labourers separately, without attracting 
the notice of their foremen. Through an interpreter, the labourers began to 
dare to express their problems to officials. The results of inspections in 1924 
and 1925 provided evidence of a whole raft of violent acts, fraud, caning, and 
murder (Het Nieuws van den dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 11-8-1925). Therefore, 
the results of Labour Inspectorate in 1925 concluded that the conditions of the 
Chinese labourers in panglongs were far worse than those of the Chinese and 
Javanese labourers in East Sumatra, on Bangka and in Sawahlunto.
At this juncture it is impossible to describe the results of annual 
investigations of the Labour Inspectorate in more detail. The investigation 
reports show similar, repeated stories about the terrible working and living 
conditions of the labourers. G. Pastor of the Labour Inspectorate in Batavia has 
given a detailed report of the investigation into the panglongs in Bengkalis and 
Tanjung Pinang. He concluded that these conditions at the time of enactment 
of the labour regulation were still very far from being what should have been 
expected. Great concern was raised about the many cases of vigilanteism 
perpetrated against the labourers by foremen.  For instance, Tjan Tau and 
Lau A Fok were accused of having stolen a ring and were punished by their 
foremen without any form of investigation into the charge. The head of the 
panglong ordered two foremen, Heng Lie and Lie Jie, to tie Liong Kwai up with 
534 535Wacana Vol. 18 No. 2 (2017) Erwiza Erman, Chinese taukeh, labourer, and state control
a rope, cane him and then take him to a sampan-owner to be abandoned in a 
forest in Sumatra. But the sampan-owner thought he could profit from these 
two unfortunates. He took them to Panglong no. 82, hoping be rewarded with 
“opium geld”. Unfortunately, the head of the panglong did not want to employ 
them, wary of the amount of scarring on their bodies caused by the caning. 
The head of the panglong sent them into the forest where they were eventually 
discovered by the Labour Inspectorate team. In another case, Sieuw, Liong Tjoi, 
and Tjong Jie, who were still young - only about fifteen, were victims caning 
by their foremen. Not only had the bamboo badly bruised them, in places the 
flesh had been laid open to the bone. Tjong Lie who had been beaten by his 
foreman, Seng Tjung, died and other labourers were ordered to bury him for 
an extra payment of 1.50 dollars (Pastor 1927: 57).
When it did set about to rectify the bad working conditions, the colonial 
government blamed the Chinese taukehs who had not taken any responsibility 
for their labourers. It seems that the colonial government was better equipped 
to tackle the this labour problem than were the Chinese taukehs. The strength of 
the colonial government derived from the reformation of the late-colonial state-
formation in which the Labour Inspectorate had already been instituted under 
the Department of Justice. It could now carry out more intensive investigations 
than it had ever been able to pursue before. Armed with the results of the 
investigation by the  Labour Inspectorate, the colonial government pressured 
the taukehs to assume more responsibility for their people and to donate some 
of their money to establish a panglong hospital. Heeding the suggestions 
made by the labour inspectors, in 1931 the colonial government closed eight 
panglongs that had violated labour regulations (Het Nieuws van den Dag voor 
Nederlandsch-Indië 20-3-1934).  
There were some improvements in labour conditions after the second 
decade of twentieth century. Wages were paid on time, something which 
had not happened in previous years. Malfeasance in payment in advance 
and debt calculations by the head of panglongs began to decrease (Bataviaasch 
Nieuwsblad 1-11-1927). Progress was also visible in the provision of housing, 
food, and health care. The number of opium-users among the labourers 
tended to decrease. The decrease in opium was also as a result of cutting back 
on the supply of opium by taukehs to panglongs during the depression. The 
(kangaroo) “panglong court” which the head of panglong had once headed 
was already in decline. 
The Chinese taukehs began to change their attitudes too, not just because of 
increased pressure by the colonial government but also because their business 
prospects during the depression were gloomy and they had new competitors, 
in the form of Japanese businessmen. In October 1933, the governor of East 
Sumatra granted concessions in the area of Mering Forest to a Japanese 
businessman, Takahashi. The ownership of the concessions was then taken 
over by the company Nanyo Ringyo KAISHA. In Rangsang, concessions 
were awarded to two Japanese businessmen, KUDJI and Miagughi who had 
a working capital of ten million guilders (MVO, O.J. Rookmaaker 26-10-1933: 
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3-4).  Changing attitudes of  the taukehs can be seen from the shift of controlling 
panglong from Singapore to the site of panglong area. As an example, in 1928, 
taukeh A Kong stayed for months in his panglong area (De Telegraaf 28-2-1928). 
Communication between colonial officials and taukehs began discussing 
the issue of the collapse of the timber market during the depression. Many 
taukehs had been forced to close their panglong businesses and look for other 
opportunites like as gambier and sago plantations. Taukehs moved the Chinese 
labourers to work on the gambier plantations or had repatriated them to 
Singapore (MvO, W.H. Gerritsen 26-8-1933: 20).
As said earlier, they had no hope of being free after having worked out 
their three-year contract. It means that the working and living conditions of 
the Chinese labourers were akin to slavery. They were caught in a vicious 
circle being under contract to work in order to pay off their debts which keep 
piling up because of the imposition of non-economic coercions by the dismal 
Chinese taukeh implemented through the head of panglongs. 
The working and living conditions of the Chinese labourers in panglongs 
prove that the politics of exploitation was also rife among the Chinese 
capitalists. The ways in it was implemented in a panglong business was 
composed of many factors. It was the product of an amalgam of economic 
interests, the management of the production process, non-economic coercion 
and security problems in the workplace. Until the second decade of twentieth 
century, the role of colonial state in controlling the businesses, supervising 
the working and living conditions of Chinese labourers was weak. This 
lack of control by the state is inseparable from from malfunctioning of the 
bureaucracy in the outer islands and from the budgetary limits which made 
it very difficult to provide marine transportation and personnel. However, 
gradually limitations began to be overcome, especially when the issue of the 
living conditions of Chinese labourers became a pressing public issue and was 
hotly discussed on a wider level in the Volksraad and the Lower House in the 
Netherlands. Intervention by the state brought a reduction in the number of 
violent attacks on Chinese labourers by foremen, an improvement in health 
care, food, and the accommodation in the kongsi house. The introduction of 
new methods of investigation by the labour inspectors meant that the Chinese 
labourers could now stand up for themselves and complain about miserable 
living conditions and any violence committed by their mandors to the Labour 
Inspectorate officials.
4. conclusIon
The amount of capital owned by Singaporean Chinese taukehs and the high 
demand for forest products were the principal reasons for the establishment 
of panglongs. These businesses was controlled by the taukehs in Singapore, 
and the work on them was done by the Chinese labourers recruited from 
Singapore and transported to isolated, cut off, scattered panglong areas in 
the eastern region of Sumatra. The advent of the Chinese labourers meant 
the formation of small Chinese working class communities living in the rich 
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forest areas. The profits of the panglong businesses poured into the hands of 
the taukehs who lived in Singapore, where they accumulated the panglong 
products and re-exported them outside Singapore, mainly to other parts of 
Southeast Asia and the Far East. The Chinese labourerers who produced what 
they sold had to toil away in miserable living conditions. It seems that the 
fate of the Chinese labourers exploited by the Chinese taukeh was worse than 
other cases as shown by Jan Breman and Ann Laura Stoler in his/her studies 
or of those in the Bangka tin-mines and the Ombilin coal-mines as studied 
by Heidhuis and Erman. However, unlike what happened to the Javanese 
labourers mentioned above, the miserable living conditions of the Chinese 
labourers in panglongs occurred far away from the public eye; hence the late 
response of the colonial government apparatus. Therefore, the  protest lodged 
by Haji Agus Salim in the Volksraad caused such a public outcry. 
The atrocious living conditions were the result of the manipulation 
of the recruitment process, lack of proper food and health care, payment 
problems, abuse of power by foremen and lack of security in the workplace. 
The workplace of a panglong business was as a powerful element which could 
influence the working and living conditions of the labourers. Limitations 
in budget, marine transport facilities and personnel, compounded by the 
still sketchy formation of the colonial bureucracy, undermined the ability 
of the colonial state to control the panglongs and offer the Chinese labourers 
proper protection. When the issue  of the miserable conditions of the Chinese 
labourers was published in the press and debated by politians in the Parliament 
(Volksraad) and the Lower House in the Hague in the second decade of the 
twentieth century, the colonial state stepped up its efforts to intervene more 
effectively than it ever had done before. Its most potent measures were the 
passing of the Panglong Reglement, proper law enforcement, provision of 
better transport facilities and appointment of the personnel needed to impose 
law and order and the  setting up branch offices of the Labour Inspectorate. 
All these factors conspired to ensure the success of efforts to improve the 
working and living conditions of the Chinese labourers.
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